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THE WIRETAP ACT-RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: A FRAME­
WORK FOR DETERMINING THE "INTERCEPTION" OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS FOLLOWING United States v. Councilman's Re­
jection of the StoragelTransit Dichotomy 
INTRODUCTION 
Electronic communications such as e-maiF have ushered in a 
communications revolution.2 The Electronic Communications Pri­
vacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA")3 attempted to extend the protections of 
the existing Wiretap Act4 to the modern, digital forms of communi­
cation.s Yet, it has not always been clear when the ECPA's wiretap 
provisions apply and when they do not. 
Imagine that two people are interested in covertly intercepting 
all of your e-mail communications. The first one, Bob, goes to great 
expense and difficulty to develop a method of "overhearing" your 
incoming and outgoing messages while they are actually traveling 
1. Throughout this Note, He-mail" is used as a proxy for all forms of electronic 
communications. See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 12, United States v. 
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2004 WL 3201458 (describing e­
mail as the "paradigmatic example of electronic communications" under the Wiretap 
Act). It is the type of electronic communication at issue in many of the cases examined. 
Moreover, the technical details of howe-mail is transmitted are similar to those of other 
forms of digital electronic communications. 
2. Indeed, billions of e-mail messages are transmitted by American businesses 
every day. Max Guirguis, Electronic Mail Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation 
of Privacy, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'y 135, 142 (2003). E-mail has, in fact, become "indis­
pensable" to the business world. [d. 
3. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3121-3127 
(2000». 
4. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. 
III, 82 Stat. 197, 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000». 
The term "wiretap" dates to more than a century ago and originally referred to con­
necting to a telegraph or telephone wire in order to monitor communications traveling 
along the wire. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1473 (11th ed. 
2003). In current usage, though, the term is no longer restricted to the interception of 
communications traveling by wire, nor even to telephone and telegraph communica­
tions. WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF 
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 151 (1998). 
5. In particular, the Wiretap Act requires a court order based on a strong, partic­
ularized showing of probable cause to believe that the targeted individual has commit­
ted or will commit an offense enumerated by the statute, and that wiretap surveillance 
is likely to yield evidence of such offense. In addition, the Wiretap Act requires close 
judicial oversight of the entire process. See infra Part I.D. 
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along a wire between computers. It is an exceedingly difficult pro­
cess, and it takes very expensive equipment to achieve his goal. 
The second, Alice, has a cheaper solution. She uses off-the-shelf 
software to alter the mail-delivery software that routes messages to 
and from your e-mail mailbox. The software waits until the e-mail 
is no longer traveling along a wire, but is instead in temporary com­
puter storage on the routing computer. The software retrieves your 
messages from temporary storage, sends a duplicate to a separate e­
mail address where Alice can then read all of your e-mail at her 
leisure, and sends the original message on to its destination. Her 
method is cheap, efficient, easy, and nearly impossible to detect (at 
least by you). 
Which spy are you more worried about? Is it Bob, who must 
expend great effort and enormous sums of money to monitor the 
wire your e-mail travels over? Or is it Alice, whose off-the-shelf 
software can achieve the same end, quickly and at low cost, by mon­
itoring the computer storage that your messages are temporarily 
held in before delivery? Under current wiretap law, Bob's mode of 
surveillance is unquestionably prohibited, while Alice's low-budget, 
relatively simple surveillance scheme mayor may not be prohibited, 
depending on the court's interpretation of the meaning of 
"intercept. " 
This was the issue presented in United States v. Councilman, a 
recent case in the First Circuit, which held that even Alice's brand 
of surveillance is prohibited by federal wiretap law.6 The issue, 
however, is far from settled. Decisions in several other circuits 
have found that any retrieval from electronic storage, regardless of 
how temporary and incidental to transmission the storage is, is by 
definition not an intercept (and therefore not prohibited) under 
federal wiretap law.7 This Note reviews the development of the 
"storage test," the First Circuit's rejection of such a test in Council­
man, and the shortcomings of both approaches. It then proposes an 
alternative approach and provides an analytical framework for fu­
ture courts to use in resolving the question whether a given acquisi­
tion constitutes an "intercept" within the meaning of the law. 
Part I of this Note examines the evolution of wiretap law in 
America. Part II analyzes how the courts have determined whether 
and when a given type of electronic communication is intercepted 
within the meaning of the statute. Prior to 2005, every circuit to 
6. 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005); see infra Part III. 
7. See infra Part I1.B. 
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have addressed the issue had either adopted or spoken favorably of 
the storage/transit dichotomy that was first developed in the Fifth 
Circuit. Part III examines in detail the First Circuit's 2005 Council­
man decision, which rejected the storage/transit test used by other 
circuits. Part IV establishes that the storage/transit test must be re­
jected, notes that Councilman provides no definite alternative, and 
offers such an alternative approach, along with a proposed frame­
work for courts to use in determining whether and when a given 
electronic communication has been intercepted within the meaning 
of the statute. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Brief History of the Right to Privacy in America 
Privacy has been described in many ways. To some, it is one's 
"interest in not having his affairs known to others."8 Another the­
ory focuses on the "claim of individuals, groups or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent informa­
tion about them is communicated to others."9 Perhaps most memo­
rably, the right to privacy has been characterized simply as "the 
right to be let alone. "10 
The intellectual origins of a right to privacy lie in the notion 
that there is a boundary between the public and private parts of our 
lives, recognized since the time of the ancient Greeks.ll It is the 
separation of these realms that establishes the distinction between 
those things that should be shown to others and those things that 
should remain hidden.12 Even the most ancient of written systems 
of law, the Hammurabi Code, recognized that certain rights with an 
aspect of privacy to them were of great importance, to the point of 
providing the death penalty for the crime of breaking into another 
man's home.13 However rooted in the mists of human philosophy 
and history the right of individual privacy may be, in the modern 
8. RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 73 (West 1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939)). 
9. Id. (quoting ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)). 
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 193 (1890). The phrase was repeated by Justice Brandeis in his famous dis­
sent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
The coinage of the phrase has been attributed to Judge Thomas Cooley, in about 1880. 
TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 23. 
11. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 2-3. 
12. Id. at 10 (quoting an excerpt from HANNA ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 
38-78 (1958)). 
13. Id. at 7 n.2 (quoting Article 2 of the Code of Hammurabi, which provided: "If 
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era, the scope of that right is defined by statutory and judge-made 
law. 
A right to privacy was not explicitly recognized in American 
law until the late nineteenth century, though such a right in various 
forms was implicitly protected under constitutional principles and 
common law tort theory.14 The "right to be let alone" was first 
identified by Judge Thomas Cooley in the 1880s.15 In 1890, Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis used the phrase again in laying out the 
natural-law foundation of privacy rights and advocating for the ex­
plicit recognition of a legally-protected right to privacy.16 The first 
explicit judicial recognition of the right to privacy occurred only fif­
teen years laterP The campaign for explicit recognition then lan­
guished for decades. 
By 1960, Dean William Prosser had identified four main types 
of tort-based rights to privacy from the case law.18 The first of 
these, later incorporated into the Second Restatement of Torts,19 
involved the "intrusion upon [one's] seclusion or solitude, or into 
his private affairs. "20 It is this sort of violation of privacy that is the 
concern of wiretap law.21 
a man makes a breach into a house, one shall kill him in front of the breach, and bury 
him in it"). 
14. Id. at 22 (discussing the First Amendment's rights to free speech, press, and 
association; the Third Amendment's protection against the quartering of soldiers in 
one's home; the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures; the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination; and the common law 
tort protections from nuisance, trespass, and private eavesdropping). 
15. /d. at 23. 
16. Id.; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193. The Warren and Bran­
deis article is regarded as one of the most influential pieces of legal scholarship in the 
history of American law. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 38. 
17. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 23 (citing Pavesich v. New Eng. Life 
Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), which recognized a legal right of privacy and held that 
the publication of a person's picture without his or her consent violated that right). 
18. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,389 (1960) (describing the 
four torts as: 1) intrusions on one's seclusion or solitude, or into one's private affairs; 2) 
public disclosure of embarrassing facts; 3) publicity placing one in a false light; and 4) 
appropriation of one's name or likeness). Dean Prosser noted that at the time only four 
states had case law rejecting the right of privacy. [d. at 388. 
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). The Restatement 
notes that even if the defendant makes no use of the information obtained, the intru­
sion alone subjects him to liability. § 652B cmt. b. 
20. Prosser, supra note 18, at 389. 
21. The Restatement (Second) of Torts also specifically provides a wiretapping 
example: "A, a private detective seeking evidence for use in a lawsuit ... taps B's 
telephone wires and installs a recording device to make a record of B's conversations. A 
has invaded B's privacy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2, 3 
(1977); see Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 229 (1931) (holding that tapping a tele­
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B. Wiretap Law Before 1968 
The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.22 In Boyd v. United States, the Supreme 
Court suggested that Fourth Amendment protections might extend 
beyond the physical invasion of property in the conduct of searches 
to cover the broader notion of "the privacies of life. "23 When first 
directly confronted with this question in Olmstead v. United 
States,24 however, the Court backed away from such a notion and 
held that without a physical trespass into a private area, no viola­
tion of the Fourth Amendment could OCCUr.25 
In Olmstead, the Court's earliest wiretap case, the issue was 
whether law enforcement's warrantless wiretapping of the defend­
ants' telephone lines was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.26 
The Supreme Court held that there was no violation because the 
wiretapping had not involved any physical trespass into the defend­
ants' homes or offices.27 The Court refused to enlarge the Fourth 
Amendment's language "beyond the possible practical meaning of 
houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search 
and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight. "28 Instead, the Court ad­
hered to a literal interpretation, holding that the search could only 
be of "material things-the person, the house, his papers or his 
effects. "29 
But the Court spoke with a divided voice, splitting 5-4, with 
Justice Brandeis delivering a vigorous dissent in defense of privacy 
rights, almost forty years after his landmark Harvard Law Review 
article on the sUbject.30 In fact, Olmstead is now more often 
remembered for Justice Brandeis's dissent than for the majority's 
holding.31 To Justice Brandeis, the invasion of "informational pri­
phone line is an invasion of privacy akin to eavesdropping that can serve as the basis for 
an action for damages); see also Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111-12 (1964) 
(holding that invasion of privacy is an actionable tort, and that installation of a listening 
device in a bedroom was such an invasion, even if nothing was overheard). 
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
23. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
24. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
25. Id. at 465-66. 
26. Id. at 455. 
27. Id. at 465-66. 
28. Id. at 465. 
29. Id. at 464. 
30. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 
10, at 193. 
31. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 . 
RUTGERS L. REV. 781 (2000) (examining the evolution of dissenting Supreme Court 
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vacy" was far more alarming than searches and seizures in the phys­
ical realm. "As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and 
general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppres­
sion when compared with wire-tapping."32 
Congress was more receptive than the Court to the proposition 
that the American people should be protected from the insidious 
invasiveness of wiretaps. In 1934, Congress enacted the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 (FCA).33 Section 605 of this Act pro­
vided explicit protection against electronic surveillance of private 
conversations: "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender 
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the exis­
tence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such inter­
cepted communication to any person ...."34 In Nardone v. United 
States,35 the Supreme Court held that the statute prohibited on stat­
utory grounds what the Court had not prohibited on constitutional 
grounds in Olmstead: the government could not use evidence ob­
tained from illegal wiretaps in federal courts.36 
Section 605 and Nardone provided only limited protection, 
however. . First, the Department of Justice interpreted Nardone as 
prohibiting the interception and divulgence of private wire commu­
nications, but not interception alone, so long as the contents of the 
messages were not divulged to anyone outside the federal govern­
ment.37 Second, the FBI secured presidential authority to conduct 
extensive wiretapping for national and domestic security pur­
poses.38 Third, for fifteen years, the Supreme Court held that the 
opinions that become more famous than majority opinions). The Supreme Court has 
cited the Olmstead dissent since 1945-more than twenty years before the decision was 
overruled. [d. at 798. In fact, the Court cited the Olmstead dissent eleven times before 
overruling the case in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and over 40 times since 
then. [d. at 798 n.91. 
32. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
33. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, tit. VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 
(1934) (current version at 47 U.S.c. § 605(a) (2000)). While the original § 605 prohib­
ited both unauthorized interception and divulging or publishing the contents of the 
communication, the current version omits prohibition of interception, leaving that act 
to be covered by the Wiretap Act, and simply prohibits any person "receiving, assisting 
in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign commu­
nication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, 
purport, effect, or meaning thereof." 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2000). 
34. § 605, 48 Stat. at 1104. 
35. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
36. [d. at 382. 
37. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 4, at 157. 
38. With war on the horizon, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover convinced President 
Roosevelt to authorize the use of wiretaps for intelligence purposes for the sake of 
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federal law was not applicable to the states, and thus did not bar the 
use of evidence obtained from illegal wiretaps in state courtS.39 Fi­
nally, technology provided another means for avoiding the statu­
tory prohibitions on wiretapping. While § 605 prohibited 
interception of any wire or radio communication, it did not explic­
itly prohibit other forms of electronic eavesdropping, such as sur­
veillance using hidden microphones.4o 
The decade of the 1960s marked a dramatic turn-around in the 
battle for protection from warrantless wiretapping. A series of Su­
preme Court decisions gradually extended the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment41 while Congress prepared to implement a fundamen­
tal change in the nature of federal wiretap law.42 
In 1967, the Supreme Court unequivocally established the right 
to conversational privacy beyond the rigid bounds of a physical in­
trusion.43 In Berger v. New York,44 the defendant's conviction was 
based on evidence obtained from an electronic eavesdropping de­
vice that had been placed pursuant to a state-authorized warrant.45 
The Supreme Court held that the state's authorizing statute failed 
to require sufficient particularity in the scope and duration of the 
desired warrant to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's constitutional 
national security. Id. at 157-58. After the war, the authority to wiretap for intelligence 
purposes was renewed, and even broadened, to include purposes of "domestic security" 
and "subversive activity." Id. at 158-61. The full extent of FBI wiretapping during this 
period remains unclear, but is known to have extended to the surveillance of civil rights 
leaders, members of the press, Supreme Court justices, senators, and congressmen. Id. 
at 162-63. 
39. Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and 
Interception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 28 (2003) (citing 
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952)). The Supreme Court eventually reversed 
itself, but did so only two days before the enactment of the federal Wiretap Act in 1968, 
which would change the entire landscape of wiretap law. Id. at 29 n.142 (citing Lee v. 
Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385 (1968)). 
40. Nor, under Olmstead, were other forms of eavesdropping considered Fourth 
Amendment violations absent a physical trespass. Thus, non-wiretap forms of elec­
tronic surveillance, such as microphone surveillance, were regarded as perfectly legal 
under § 605 and under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 29 (2003); see also Goldman v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-33, 135 (1942) (holding that the use of a microphone to 
overhear the defendant's side of his telephone conversations did not constitute a viola­
tion of the federal wiretap law, nor a Fourth Amendment violation, so long as no physi­
cal trespass within the confines of a private area was made). 
41. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
42. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 
tit. III, 82 Stat. 197,211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)). 
43. See Berger, 388 U.S. 41; Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
44. Berger, 388 U.S. 41. 
45. Id. at 44-45. 
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standards.46 The Court recognized that the use of electronic eaves­
dropping devices was permissible, but only "under the most precise 
and discriminate circumstances," and when "the 'commission of a 
specific offense' was charged."47 The Fourth Amendment did not 
render the home or office completely inviolable,48 but the New 
York statute failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity 
standard.49 
Six months after Berger, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
Olmstead's physical intrusion test in Katz v. United States.50 In its 
place, the Court enunciated the "expectation of privacy" concept.51 
In the Court's view, the physical intrusion test obscured the real 
issue: "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."52 
What a person "seeks to preserve as private" is protected under the 
Fourth Amendment regardless of the presence or absence of any 
physical intrusion. 53 
Even so, electronic surveillance could be constitutionally au­
thorized,54 but only in certain, narrowly-drawn circumstances. The 
basis, purpose, and extent of the surveillance must be sufficiently 
precise and constrained, so as to justify a "very limited search and 
seizure" for legitimate law-enforcement purposes.55 The safeguards 
necessitated by such a covert intrusion into a citizen's privacy re­
quired close judicial supervision.56 Absent a judicial safeguard, 
even an unquestionable showing of probable cause could not pre­
vent a warrantless search from being held unlawful and "per se un­
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. "57 
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, enunciated the new 
standard of review for Fourth Amendment cases as whether the 
46. Id. at 55-56, 63. 
47. Id. at 63 (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966». 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 60. 
50. Katz v. United States, 389 u.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (holding that warrantless 
eavesdropping on conversations in a public telephone booth violated the Fourth 
Amendment, even absent a physical intrusion). 
51. Id. at 353. 
52. Id. at 351. 
53. Id. at 351-52. 
54. Id. at 354 (citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966». 
55. Id. at 354-56. 
56. Id. at 348. 
57. Id. at 356-57. The government argued for the creation of a new exception to 
the warrant requirement, for cases involving surveillance of a telephone booth. Id. at 
358. The Court rejected this, explicitly holding "the procedure of antecedent justifica­
tion" (a warrant) to be a constitutional requirement for the kind of electronic surveil­
lance at issue. Id. at 359. 
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person searched had a "reasonable expectation of privacy."58 This 
standard has been routinely invoked since Katz as the general test 
for Fourth Amendment violations.59 
C. The Wiretap Act of 1968 
Following the enactment of the FCA in 1934, wiretap surveil­
lance was (ostensibly) prohibited under federal law.60 Congres­
sional investigations in the 1960s into organized crime, however, 
revealed the need for the legal use of wiretaps by law enforcement 
in order to combat that problem.61 Congress finally legalized wire­
tapping, to a limited extent, in 1968.62 
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 con­
tained a provision entitled "Title III-Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance," now commonly referred to as the "Wiretap Act," 
which legalized certain wiretapping when conducted with strong ju­
dicialoversight.63 The Wiretap Act completely revamped the prior 
wiretap law (§ 605 of the FCA), at once permitting the use of wire­
taps and other forms of electronic surveillance under federal law, 
while also implementing considerable statutory limitations and pro­
tections against the abuse of such surveillance.64 
Congress indicated in its findings a number of concerns that 
had led it to enact the Wiretap Act.65 First, Congress found that the 
use of wiretaps and other devices to overhear wire and oral commu­
nications without legal sanction was widespread.66 Second, the use 
of such surveillance was a critical aid to law enforcement in fighting 
crime, especially, organized crime.67 Third, it was necessary for 
Congress to establish a uniform system for authorizing the intercep­
tion of wire or oral communications to ensure that the privacy of 
58. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
59. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 97. 
60. See supra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text. As noted, though, this law had 
not actually prevented the frequent use of wiretaps, for various reasons. 
61. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 4, at 169-70. But the idea of legislation that 
would legalize wiretaps for law enforcement purposes was not universally embraced. Id. 
at 170. Police, judges, and state attorneys general from around the nation opposed the 
creation of federal wiretap laws, as did the Attorney General of the United States at 
that time. Id. at 170-71. 
62. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 
tit. III, 82 Stat. 197,211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)). 
63. Tit. III, 82 Stat. at 211. 
64. § 801(b)-(d), 82 Stat. at 211. 
65. § 801, 82 Stat. at 211. 
66. § 801(a), 82 Stat. at 211. 
67. § 801(c), 82 Stat. at 211. 
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such communications was effectively protected against unautho­
rized intrusions.68 Finally, as an additional measure of protection 
against abuses that would put the privacy of innocent people at risk, 
Congress prescribed close judicial oversight of authorized commu­
nications surveillance, as well as limitations restricting such surveil­
lance to the investigation of certain major and enumerated crimes.69 
The first line of defense against the abusive use of electronic 
surveillance is the wiretap authorization process. A wiretap can 
only be requested by certain designated state or federal prosecuting 
attorneys'?o The request must be made to a judge, and must detail 
the circumstances, the specific criminal offense being investigated, 
the location to be bugged or tapped, the person whose communica­
tions are to be monitored, the type of communication anticipated, 
and the time frame for the proposed surveillance.71 In addition, the 
applicant must convince the judge that other, normal investigative 
methods have failed or are likely to fail to garner the evidence 
sought,?2 If the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to 
believe the contentions of the surveillance application, he or she 
can issue an order authorizing the surveillance for a period of not 
more than thirty days,?3 Renewal of a wiretap order for an addi­
tional thirty days can be obtained by going through the entire pro­
cess again.74 These heightened requirements have led 
commentators and some judges to refer to the court orders so is­
sued as "super-warrants. "75 
68. § 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211. 
69. § 801(d), 82 Stat. at 211-12. It is important to note that the National Security 
Agency's current, controversial program of warrantless foreign-intelligence wiretapping 
is beyond the scope of this Note. The terrorism-related wiretaps, if subject to any fed­
eral statute, would be subject to the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, not the domestic Wiretap Act. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. I, §§ 101-111, 92 Stat. 1783-1796 (1978). There is, of course, 
considerable controversy at present as to whether the NSA wiretaps are subject to stat­
utory limitations, or if they are instead valid under the executive authority of the Presi­
dent of the United States. 
70. 18 U.S.c. § 2516 (2000). 
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (2000). 
72. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3). 
73. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(5). Warrantless national security electronic surveillance 
continued until the Supreme Court declared such practices unconstitutional in 1972. 
DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 4, at 176 (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. 
Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972». 
74. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(5). 
75. See infra note 101. 
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D. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
In the years following the enactment of the Wiretap Act, com­
munications technology underwent dramatic changes.76 The Wire­
tap Act had been designed to regulate the communications 
technology of 1968. By the 1980s, electronic communications (such 
as e-mail) had become common, and the Wiretap Act simply did 
not regulate them effectively, if at all. In 1986, Congress enacted 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")77 to bring 
electronic surveillance of digital communications within the scope 
of federallaw.78 
The ECPA was enacted to "update and clarify Federal privacy 
protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new com­
puter and telecommunications technologies."79 Given the pace of 
computer and telecommunications development, the Wiretap Act 
was regarded by the ECPA's sponsors as "hopelessly out of date" 
because of its failure to protect the integrity of data communica­
tions, electronic mail, cellular and cordless telephone transmissions, 
and other forms of electronic communication.80 
To address these modern concerns, the ECPA altered the ex­
isting statute in three ways. Title I of the ECPA amended the ex­
isting Wiretap Act (chapter 119 of title 18 of the U.S. Code) to 
include electronic communications within its scope.81 Title II of the 
ECPA (called the Stored Communications Act, or SCA) added pro­
tections for wire and electronic communications retained in com­
puter storage facilities, because such information did not enjoy 
either constitutional or statutory protections at the time.82 Title III 
of the ECPA addressed the use of pen registers and trap and trace 
devices.83 This Note is concerned primarily with the reach of Title 
76. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 230. 
77. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3121-3127 
(2000». 
78. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 230; S. REp. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), 
as reprinted in 1986 u.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. 
79. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. 
80. Id. at 2. 
81. Id. at 3. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. Title III of the ECPA is not relevant to this Note. Pen registers do not 
record the content of wire or electronic communications, but provide the user with 
collateral information, such as the number dialed, or the number from which a call 
originates. Id.at 46. See generally Robert Ditzion, Note, Electronic Surveillance in the 
Internet Age: The Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1321, 1325-35 
(2004) (discussing pen-register technologies and applicable legal standards). 
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I, the Wiretap Act (as amended), and to a limited extent Title II, 
the SCA.84 
Title I amended the Wiretap Act in various ways. The two as­
pects most relevant to this Note are the changes to the definition of 
"wire communication" under the Act and the addition of the term 
"electronic communications" to the Act. First, prior to enactment 
of the ECPA, the definition of "wire communication" in the Wire­
tap Act read: "any communication made ... by the aid of wire, 
cable, or other like connection."85 The ECPA modified this to: 
"any aural transfer made ... by the aid of wire, cable, or other like 
connection."86 This change from "communication" to "aural trans­
fer" reflects Congress's intent that wire communications should be 
limited to communications "which include the human voice at any 
point between and including the points of origin and reception."87 
The ECPA also added to the definition of "wire communica­
tion" a critical provision, reading, "and such term includes any elec­
tronic storage of such communication."88 The purpose of this 
language was to indicate that "wire communications in storage like 
voice mail, remain wire communications," protected by the Wiretap 
Act.89 In essence, a "wire communication" was meant to include 
any communication that could be perceived as a human voice at 
some point in the process, while "electronic communications" (dis­
cussed immediately below) were meant to include all other forms of 
communication employing electronic transmission technologies.90 
The second relevant change that the ECPA made to the prior 
Wiretap Act was to include electronic communications within the 
scope of its protections.91 The ECPA defines "electronic communi­
cation" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, 
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by 
a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo optical sys­
84. This Note will refer to both the pre-ECPA Wiretap Act and Title I of the 
ECPA as the Wiretap Act. For clarity, the pre-ECPA version will be specifically identi­
fied as such when the two versions contain relevant differences. Title II of the ECPA 
will be referred to as the Stored Communications Act or the SCA. 
85. 18 U.S.c. § 2510(1) (1970). 
86. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I, 
§ 101(a), 100 Stat. 1848, 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. § 2510(1) 
(2000». 
87. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 11. 
88. § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 1848. 
89. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12. 
90. Id. 
91. See § 101(c), 100 Stat. at 1851. 
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tern" exclusive of certain categories, and in particular, excluding 
any wire or oral communication.92 The ECPA also expanded vari­
ous provisions of the Wiretap Act that had applied only to wire or 
oral communications to now apply to electronic communications, as 
wel1.93 The essential purpose of adding electronic communications 
to the Wiretap Act was to update the protections offered by the law 
in light of technological changes in communications.94 In particu­
lar, Congress wanted to protect the privacy of electronic communi­
cations in a way similar to that in which wire communications had 
been protected by the Wiretap Act since 1968.95 
Title II of the ECPA, the SCA, added a new chapter to title 18 
of the U.S. Code.96 The SCA makes it unlawful to gain unautho­
rized access "to a wire or electronic communication while it is in 
electronic storage" at a facility providing electronic communica­
tions services.97 The statute provides for both criminal penalties 
and civil damages under a private cause of action.98 While the 
Wiretap Act is the portion of the ECPA that is of primary impor­
tance to interpreting the meaning of "intercept," it will be shown 
that the interplay of the SCA with the Wiretap Act is also 
significant. 
II. THE MEANING OF "INTERCEPT" 
The question of when the acquisition of an electronic commu­
nication constitutes an "intercept" in violation of the Wiretap Act is 
one that has posed a considerable challenge for the courts. The 
Wiretap Act is infamous for its lack of clarity,99 and any reading of 
the provisions relevant to the meaning of "intercept" introduces in­
consistencies. loo It is not a trivial point of law: if a given acquisition 
falls within the bounds of the Wiretap Act, a very restrictive judicial 
application process must be followed to obtain a court order au­
92. § 101(a)(6)(C), 100 Stat. at 1849 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. § 2510(12) 
(2000». 
93. § 101(c), 100 Stat. at 1851 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510(5), 
2510(8), 251O(9)(b), 2510(11), and 2511-2519 (2000». 
94. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-2. 
95. Id. at 5. 
96. § 201, 100 Stat. at 1860 (adding chapter 121, codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. 
§§ 2701-2711 (2000». 
97. 18 U.S.c. § 2701(a). 
98. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2701(b), 2707. 
99. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines (Konop I), 236 F.3d 1035,1042 (9th Cir. 2001). 
100. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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thorizing surveillance.101 If an acquisition is not an "intercept" 
under the Wiretap Act, the less rigorous requirements of a court 
order or ordinary search warrant under the SeA are all that stand 
between law enforcement and access to the communications.102 
Thus, how the courts choose to interpret the statutory term "inter­
101. See 18 U.S.c. §§ 2516, 2518. The provisions of § 2518 set a high threshold 
for the issuing of a court order authorizing interception of wire, oral, or electronic com­
munications. An application for such an order must articulate the particular criminal 
offense suspected, the location of the place where the interception is to take place, the 
particular type of communications to be intercepted, and the identity of the person 
suspected of the offense and whose communications are therefore to be intercepted. 18 
U.S.c. § 2518(1)(b). The application must also state in detail the other investigative 
methods employed, and why such methods have been unsuccessful or will be unlikely to 
succeed. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(1)(c). For the judge to issue an ex parte court order, he or 
she must be convinced that there is probable cause to believe that the specified offense 
has been, is being, or will be committed, and that communications concerning the of­
fense will be obtained through the interception, if authorized. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3)(a), 
(b). The judge must also find that normal investigative procedures have been tried and 
have failed, or would be unlikely to succeed if tried. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3)(c). Further, 
each court order must specify all of the information required in the government's appli­
cation for the order. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(4). Some have taken to referring to these high­
threshold court orders for wiretap surveillance as "super warrants." See In re Applica­
tion of the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304-05 (ED.N.Y. 2005) (noting a 
hierarchy of legal processes for obtaining court approval of electronic surveillance, plac­
ing wiretaps under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 at the top of the hierarchy and designating 
them as "super-warrant," and noting that a wiretap order "requires additional showings 
not necessary to obtain a more traditional warrant"); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 607,630-31 (2003) (noting Congress's enactment of a "super-warrant" require­
ment for telephone and Internet surveillance by government agents). 
102. Brief on Rehearing En Banc for Senator Patrick J. Leahy as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting the United States and Urging Reversal, United States v. Councilman, 418 
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2004 WL 2707307. In contrast to the court order 
required of the Wiretap Act, the SCA has a much lower threshold barrier to authorized 
government access to stored wire and electronic communications: for communications 
in electronic storage for 180 days or less, the government must obtain an ordinary 
search warrant, "issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent 
State" procedures. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2000). For communications that have been in 
storage for more than 180 days, the government, depending on whether notice is given, 
must obtain either an ordinary search warrant, an ordinary administrative subpoena, or 
a court order. 18 U.S.c. § 2703(b) The court order under this SCA provision carries a 
substantially lower burden for the government than the one under the Wiretap Act, 
though. Under the SCA, a court order may be obtained merely "if the governmental 
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the ... [stored] information sought [is] relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation." 18 U.S.c. § 2703(d) (emphasis added). Thus, the SCA does not 
require anywhere near the level of particularity or judicial oversight as the Wiretap Act 
does to obtain disclosure of the communications in question. Indeed, when the FBI 
executes wiretaps under a valid wiretap order for the interception of e-mail, it usually 
has the service provider conduct the acquisitions, using methods very similar to those at 
issue in Councilman. Brief for the Appellant at 38, United States v. Councilman, 418 
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2003 WL 24014616. The storage test would per­
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cept" can have significant consequences for the level of privacy 
people can enjoy in their electronic communications. 
Several courts have looked back to the pre-ECPA interpreta­
tion of "intercept" and have attempted to graft that standard onto 
electronic communications. How these interpretations have played 
out and evolved over time is explored below by examining the key 
decisions on the question of precisely what constitutes an "inter­
cept" under the Wiretap Act. 
A. The "Contemporaneous" Standard: United States v. Turk 
The primary pre-ECPA precedent that courts have turned to is 
United States v. Turk.lo3 In Turk, the defendant was convicted of 
perjury, in part on the basis of a recorded telephone conversation (a 
wire communication) to which he was a party, and which contra­
dicted his sworn testimony.104 The recording had been made sur­
reptitiously by the other party to the conversation (who was not 
acting on behalf of law enforcement).105 While the making of the 
recording itself was deemed an interception under the Wiretap 
Act's definition,lo6 it did not constitute a violation of the Act "be­
cause § 2S11(2)(d) specifically exempts situations in which one 
party to the conversation is himself the interceptor."107 But the is­
sue in Turk was whether law enforcement's subsequent and unau­
thorized replaying of the recording constituted a separate 
"intercept" under the Wiretap Act. 
The Fifth Circuit held that no distinct interception occurs when 
a previously recorded conversation is replayed.los The main legisla­
mit the FBI to continue this method of acquisition, but without the necessity of a wire­
tap order. Id. 
103. 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976). 
104. Id. at 656-57. 
105. Id. at 657. 
106. The definition of "intercept" at that time differed from the current version, 
but its effect on the factual circumstances in Turk would be the same under either ver­
sion of the definition. At the time, the definition read "the aural acquisition of the 
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechani­
cal, or other device." 18 U.S.c. § 2510(4) (1970). This differs from the current version's 
text, which reads "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, 
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000). Under either version, the act of recording a private tele­
phone conversation fits the meaning of "intercept" of a wire communication. 
107. Turk, 526 F.2d at 657. The exemption reads: "It shall not be unlawful ... for 
a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire ... communication where 
such person is a party to the communication ...." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2000). 
108. Turk, 526 F.2d at 659. 
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tive intent underlying the Wiretap Act was to protect "[individual] 
privacy against unjustified intrusions."lo9 As such, it was "the act of 
[unauthorized] surveillance and not the literal 'aural acquisition' ... 
[that] was at the center of congressional concern."110 Thus, the 
court determined that no separate interception of a recorded com­
munication occurred when the recording was later replayed.Ill 
In its analysis of the meaning of "intercept," the court sug­
gested what has become known as the contemporaneity standard: 
interception requires "the contemporaneous acquisition of the com­
munication through the use of [a] device."112 Later courts would 
repeatedly refer to Turk as establishing, under the pre-ECPA wire­
tap law, a standard requiring that interception occur contemporane
ously with the transmission of a wire communication,1l3 and many 
would apply a modified version of contemporaneity as the test for 
determining when an electronic communication has been inter­
cepted in violation of the post-ECPA Wiretap Act.114 
B. 	 The Storage/Transit Dichotomy: Steve Jackson Games v. U.S. 
Secret Service 
The seminal post-ECPA decision in which "intercept" was con­
strued in the context of electronic communications is Steve Jackson 
Games, Inc. v. u.s. Secret Service.1 15 In Steve Jackson, the govern­
ment seized a computer pursuant to an ordinary search warrant, but 
did not obtain a wiretap order before reading 162 unread, private e­
mail messages stored on the computer's hard drive.1l6 The Secret 
Service read and deleted these e-mail messages.117 The Fifth Cir­
cuit considered whether reading the e-mails constituted an "inter­
cept" in violation of the Wiretap Act,118 and concluded that it did 
not.119 The court found that the e-mails were in "electronic stor­
age" when retrieved by the Secret Service, and that "Congress did 
109. 	 Id. at 658. 
110. 	 Id. at 659. 
111. 	 Id. 
112. 	 Id. at 658. 
113. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (quoting Turk, 526 F.2d at 658); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 
302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002). 
114. 	 See infra Part I1.B. 
115. 	 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 
116. 	 Id. at 459. 
117. 	 Id. 
118. 	 Id. at 460. 
119. 	 Id. at 458. 
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not intend for 'intercept' to apply to 'electronic communications' 
when those communications are in 'electronic storage."'120 This is 
the now infamous "storage/transit dichotomy." 
The court began its analysis by examining the text of the stat­
ute. The Wiretap Act defines "intercept" as "'the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communi­
cation through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other de­
vice.' "121 To determine whether an "acquisition" of an electronic 
communication had occurred, the court needed to examine the defi­
nition of "electronic communication" and decide whether the e­
mails in question had been "electronic communications" within the 
meaning of the Wiretap Act at the time they were acquired from 
the hard drive. 
In amending the previous version of the Wiretap Act to in­
clude protections for electronic communications, Congress made 
certain changes that the Steve Jackson court found key. First, the 
definition of "wire communication" had been revised from "any au­
ral transfer made ... by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connec­
tion" to explicitly stating that the "term [wire communication} 
includes any electronic storage of such communication."122 In con­
trast, the definition for "electronic communication" that was added 
by the ECPA defined that term only as "any transfer of signs, sig­
nals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photooptical system ... but does not include ... 
any wire or oral communication. "123 To the court, the most notable 
feature of these changes to the Wiretap Act was that, unlike the 
definition for "wire communication," the definition of "electronic 
communication" did not contain any provision that explicitly in­
cluded such communications while in electronic storage.124 
120. Id. at 461-62. 
121. Id. at 460 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 2510(4) (1986)). 
122. Id. at 461 (quoting 18 u.s.c. § 2510(1)) (emphasis in original). The inclu­
sion of communications in electronic storage in the definition of "wire communication" 
was struck from the statute by the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 209(1), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001). For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the pre­
2001 version is the one under discussion, unless specifically otherwise noted. While the 
definition of "wire communication" may have some bearing by analogy on the meaning 
and scope of "electronic communication" under the statute, ultimately it is not disposi­
tive on the question of how to identify interception of electronic communications under 
the Wiretap Act. 
123. Steve Jackson, 36 F.3d at 461. 
124. Id. 
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Both "wire communication" and "electronic communication" 
are described as "transfers,"125 but only the former explicitly in­
cludes "electronic storage" of such communications. The revision 
to the definition of "wire communication" meant that in addition to 
prohibiting any acquisition during transfer, the statute also prohib­
its acquiring wire communications from electronic storage. But 
"unlike the definition of 'wire communication,' the definition of 
'electronic communication' does not include electronic storage of 
such communications. "126 Since the e-mails at issue had been "in 
electronic storage" (on the hard drive) at the time they were ac­
quired for reading by the Secret Service, the court held that by the 
plain language of the statute no interception in violation of wiretap 
law had occurred.127 With this, the Steve Jackson court established 
the basic storage/transit dichotomy that many other courts would 
follow in determining when the acquisition of an electronic commu­
nication constitutes an "intercept" in violation of the Wiretap 
Act.128 
III. UNITED STATES V. COUNCILMAN (2005) 
By early 2005, the majority of circuits to have examined the 
issue had adopted the Fifth Circuit's storage/transit test when inter­
preting the term "intercept" under the Wiretap Act.129 In eleven 
years, no other circuit had openly challenged the narrowing of 
Turk's contemporaneity standard to a mechanistic determination of 
whether the communication was "in storage" at the time it was ac­
125. The definition for "wire communication" reads, "any aural transfer made by 
[wire]," and that for "electronic communication" reads, "any transfer of [information)." 
18 u.s.c. §§ 2510(1), 2510(12) (2000) (emphasis added). 
126. Steve Jackson, 36 F.3d at 461 (emphasis in original). 
127. Id. at 461-62. 
128. See Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 2005) (sug­
gesting in dicta its acceptance of the Steve Jackson storage/transit standard, though not 
required to apply such a standard because the facts of the case required decision based 
on a service-provider exception); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077-78 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (reaffirming Konop II and the storage test practically without comment); 
United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-49 (11th Cir. 2003) (adopting the Steve 
Jackson storage/transit standard where a private party gained access to files stored on 
defendant's hard drive and forwarded them to police); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting the unanimous adoption of the storage test 
in every circuit to have construed "intercept," and adopting the test itself); Konop v. 
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Steve 
Jackson and framing the issue in terms of Turk's contemporaneous-with-communica­
tion standard and holding that "contemporaneous" meant, at least, "not while [the com­
munication] is in electronic storage"). 
129. See supra note 128. 
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quired.13° This finally changed in the First Circuit case of United 
Sates v. Councilman.131 
In Councilman, an e-mail service provider duplicated the in­
coming e-mail of its clients and read the duplicates without authori­
zation.132 The defendant, Bradford Councilman, was the vice 
president of an Internet company (Interloc, Inc.) that operated an 
online rare-book listing service.133 Part of its service was to provide 
private e-mail accounts for its customers, who were book dealers.134 
In an effort to gain a commercial advantage,135 Councilman had the 
company's e-mail delivery software modified so that all messages 
sent to its customers from Amazon.com would be copied to a sepa­
rate mailbox before delivery to the intended recipient.136 The cop­
ies were made without permission, before the intended recipients 
had a chance to read their messages, and while the incoming e-mail 
messages were in some form of temporary electronic storage.137 
Councilman and other company employees read thousands of these 
copied e-mail messages.138 The First Circuit, sitting en banc, held 
that such acquisitions of e-mail could constitute interceptions in vi­
olation of the Wiretap Act, and that the district court's dismissal 
had therefore been in error.139 
The court addressed two basic issues with respect to the Wire­
130. However, one of the First Circuit's own prior decisions had expressed some 
skepticism about this approach. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(invoking the general contemporaneity standard to find "interception" of electronic 
communications where unauthorized acquisitions had occurred "simultaneously" with 
the communications, but disapproving in dicta the "less than apt" storage/transit test in 
light of technological developments since ECPA had been enacted). 
131. 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). The U.S. District Court in Massachusetts had 
held that retrieval from storage of any kind was, by the language of the statute, not an 
interception. United States v. Councilman, 245 F.Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003). 
The First Circuit's initial review resulted in a panel decision affirming the district court's 
holding. United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 2004). Later that year, 
the panel decision was vacated, and a rehearing en banc was granted. United States v. 
Councilman, 385 F.3d 793 (2004) (per curiam). The en banc opinion, rejecting the stor­
age/transit test, was delivered in August 2005, and is the primary focus of this Note's 
analysis. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 67. 
132. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 70. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. The hoped-for advantages were the development of a list of books that its 
clients were interested in, and learning about its competitors. Id. at 71. 
136. Id. at 70. 
137. Id. at 70-71. The parties stipulated that at all relevant times, the e-mails had 
been in the company computer's random access memory (RAM) or on its hard disks, or 
both. Id. at 71. 
138. Id. at 70. 
139. Id. at 85. 
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tap Act: the meaning of "electronic communication" and the mean­
ing of "intercept."14o Its principal analysis focused on the former 
issue, finding that the latter was subsumed within the former be­
cause Councilman's only argument against interception was that the 
messages were not electronic communications at the time of 
acquisition.141 
As to the meaning of "electronic communication," the prose­
cution argued that the meaning was clear from the text of the defi­
nition in the statute, and that the definition covered the e-mail 
messages at issue.142 Councilman argued, along the same lines as 
the view underlying the Steve Jackson storage/transit dichotomy, 
that any communication that is even momentarily in electronic stor­
age is technically not an "electronic communication" under the 
Wiretap ACt.143 The court held that Councilman's reading of the 
statute was inconsistent with congressional intent, and therefore 
incorrect.144 
The court found that the plain text of the Wiretap Act was un­
clear as to whether a communication in electronic storage, while in 
the process of being transmitted, fell within the protective scope of 
the ACt.145 Taken alone, the court found that the statutory defini­
tion of "electronic communication" was probably broad enough to 
cover incoming e-mail messages while they were being processed by 
the mail system's software.146 But whether that definition could be 
read alone or had to be considered in parallel with the statutory 
definition of "wire communication," which specifically includes 
messages in storage, was an ambiguous matter subject to conflicting 
interpretations based on dueling canons of construction.147 
The defendant relied on the canon that Congress's inclusion of 
particular language in one section of a statute and omission of simi­
lar language in a parallel section should be read as a deliberate in­
clusion and exclusion, respectively, of the matter contained in that 
language.148 As noted, the definition for "wire communication" ex­
plicitly includes such communications while in electronic storage, 
but the definition for "electronic communication" lacks such ex­
140. Id. at 72, 79. 
141. Id. at 80. 
142. Id. at 72. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 76. 
146. Id. at 72-73. 
147. See id. at 75 (noting that the two canons were "in tension"). 
148. Id. at 73. 
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plicit language regarding electronic storage. The defendant read 
that fact as a deliberate exclusion of communications in storage, 
even transient storage, from the meaning of "electronic communi­
cation," and therefore from the protections of the Wiretap Act.149 
In tension with that canon was another: when Congress explic­
itly enumerates exceptions to a general prohibition, additional ex­
ceptions should not be implied in the absence of clear legislative 
intent.150 Since the Wiretap Act lists four specific exceptions to the 
general definition of "electronic communication,"151 the additional 
exception of all such communications in any form of electronic stor­
age should not be implied.152 Thus, at least some communications 
in electronic storage might still be protected "electronic communi­
cations" within the meaning of the Wiretap Act. The court con­
cluded that the text was unclear and that applying the conflicting 
canons of construction did not resolve the ambiguity.153 
Turning to the legislative history, the court found that the re­
cord indicated that the term "electronic communication" was meant 
to include instances of transient electronic storage that are inciden­
tal to the communication process.154 As such, the argued distinc­
tion between "in transit" and "in storage" communications was 
rejected.155 In the court's view, the e-mails at issue, while in tempo­
rary electronic storage prior to delivery to the recipient's mailbox, 
were still "electronic communications" within the statute's 
meaning.156 
First, the court noted that the original bill's progress toward a 
final version clearly indicated that the addition of "electronic com­
munications" to the Wiretap Act was meant to provide broad pro­
tections for such communications, and that lesser protections for e­
mail had been suggested by the Department of Justice, and rejected 
by Congress.157 Further, the court noted that the definition of 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 75. 
151. Id. at 73 n.9 (quoting the exceptions given at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) as "(A) 
any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication made through a tone-only 
paging device; (C) any communication from a tracking device ... or (D) electronic 
funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system 
used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds"). 
152. Id. at 75. 
153. Id. at 76. 
154. Id. at 79. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 76-77 (citing H. REP. No. 99-647 (1986) in support of a reading provid­
ing broad protections for electronic communications such as e-mail). 
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"electronic storage" was simply intended to provide protection, via 
the SCA, for residual copies "left behind after transmission," 
messages stored in the e-mail user's mailbox, copies retained by ser­
vice providers for billing purposes or as back-ups for its customers, 
and the like.158 The court found no evidence to suggest that Con­
gress meant the statute's phrase "incidental to transmission" to ex­
clude the type of storage necessary for the actual transmission 
process itself from the protective scope of the Wiretap ACt.159 
Finally, the court found no evidence in the congressional re­
cord that the addition of the "any electronic storage of such com­
munication" language to the definition of "wire communication" 
was intended to have any substantive effect on the scope of protec­
tions afforded electronic communications.16o The addition of that 
language first appeared in the Senate markup version, after the 
House passed the bill without such language, and no Senate co­
sponsor ever suggested that such language was meant to remove 
electronic communications from the protections of the statute while 
briefly in electronic storage along the transmission route.161 Thus, 
the court found that the legislative history indicated that the "stor­
age" language in the definition of "wire communication" was sim­
ply meant to explicitly protect voice mail messages in storage, and 
that no substantive impact on the meaning of "electronic communi­
cation" was either intended or inferable.162 The court concluded 
that the meaning of "electronic communication" included any tran­
sient storage that was "intrinsic to the communications process," 
and expressly rejected the storage/transit distinction.163 
Next, the court's analysis turned to the meaning of "intercept" 
under the Wiretap Act. The court rejected Councilman's argument 
that any communication acquired from electronic storage was by 
definition not contemporaneous with transmission, and therefore 
did not constitute an "interception" in violation of the Wiretap 
158. Id. at 77 (citing the House Hearings and a report by the Office of Technol­
ogy Assessment). It is important to note that the definitions in § 2510 serve double 
duty as definitions for terms used in both the Wiretap Act and the SCA. Section 2711 
of the SCA, entitled "Definitions for chapter," states that "[a]s used in this chapter ... 
the terms defined in section 2510 [of the Wiretap Act] have, respectively, the definitions 
given such terms in that section." 18 U.S.c. § 2711(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
159. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 77-78. 
160. Id. at 78. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 78-79. 
163. Id. at 79. 
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Act.164 The court regarded this argument as essentially the same as, 
and "entirely subsumed within," the initial argument over whether 
the definition of "electronic communication" included communica­
tions in temporary storage.165 Since the court had rejected Council­
man's argument on that question, the argument over "interception" 
was rendered moot.166 
Thus, the Councilman court rejected the Steve Jackson storage/ 
transit test. Instead, the court found that in some circumstances, 
when electronic storage of a communication is "transient" and "in­
trinsic" to the communication process, the communication is re­
garded as an electronic communication within the protections of 
the Wiretap Act, and thus necessarily still subject to the possibility 
of interception in violation of the Act.167 
IV. ANALYSIS 
One fact emerges quite clearly from the various courts' discus­
sions of how best to interpret "intercept": no single interpretation is 
sufficient by itself. In particular, each interpretation fails to resolve 
the conflict within the statute.168 The statute should be interpreted 
in a manner that is most consistent with the legislative intent, even 
if some conflicts or inconsistencies remain.169 
The standard of contemporaneity provides the best indicator of 
when an "interception" within the meaning of the statute occurs, 
but this standard has largely been misapplied in cases involving 
electronic communications. Once the proper understanding of 
"contemporaneous" is established, a fairly straightforward frame­
work emerges for analyzing future cases. In the analysis that fol­
lows, this Note establishes that the storage/transit test for 
interception is flawed and must be rejected, that contemporaneity 
164. Id. at 79-80. 
165. Id. at 80. 
166. Id. at 79 (noting that Councilman had not provided any alternative argument 
for finding that the acquisitions were not "interceptions"). 
167. Id. 
168. See Dorothy Higdon Murphy, Note, United States v. Councilman and the 
Scope o/the Wiretap Act: Do Old Laws Cover New Technologies?, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 
437,441 (2005) (asserting that a close reading of the ECPA allows reasonable people to 
disagree as to the ECPA's meaning). 
169. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop 1/), 302 F.3d 868, 887 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[T]he [relevant] question [is]: which reading is more 
coherent and more consistent with Congressional intent?"); Murphy, supra note 168, at 
441-42 (explaining that Congress introduced the ECPA to reflect the broad purpose of 
the Wiretap Act). 
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interpreted broadly is the appropriate standard, and that a frame­
work for future analysis emerges from this broader standard. 
A. The Storage/Transit Test Must Be Rejected 
1. 	 Contrary to Congressional Intent, Interception is 
Virtually Impossible 
The technological nature of e-mail and other forms of elec­
tronic communication renders the actual interception of such a 
communication virtually impossible under the storage/transit test. 
This fact would cause much of the amended Wiretap Act to be ef­
fectively inoperative with respect to electronic communications. A 
reading that would render a significant portion of the statute incon­
sequential is, of course, to be avoided.170 Thus, the storage/transit 
test must be rejected in favor of an alternative that does not render 
the statute's prohibition meaningless. 
E-maip71 messages are not transmitted from sender to receiver 
in the same manner as telephone communications. E-mail 
messages are first broken down into short segments called packets, 
which are sent from one computer in the network through a series 
of other computers, until they reach the destination computer.l72 
The packets are then reassembled to recreate the original mes­
sage.173 Software on the destination computer then directs the mes­
sage from temporary storage into the more permanent storage that 
constitutes the intended recipient's "mailbox."174 In addition, the 
message may be temporarily reassembled from the packets at some 
intermediate point between sender and receiver, stored tempora­
rily, and "re-packetized for [another] leg of [its] journey."175 While 
en route, the message may not be immediately deliverable, and 
could therefore be stored for later deliveryP6 Once delivered, the 
170. See Konop II, 302 F.3d at 888; see also Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 
389,394 (1940) ("A literal reading of [a statute] which would lead to absurd results is to 
be avoided ...."). 
171. As previously mentioned, "e-mail" is used throughout this Note as a proxy 
for all forms of electronic communications. See supra note 1. Thus, if an interpretation 
fails to protect e-mail as Congress reasonably intended, then the interpretation should 
be rejected. 
172. See generally Kerr, supra note 101, at 613-16 (describing the technical details 
of "packet-switched" communications networks). 
173. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2005). 
174. Id. at 70. 
175. Id. (citing J. Klensin, RFC 2821: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Apr. 2001) 
and Jonathan B. Postel, RFC 821: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Aug. 1982)). 
176. Id. 
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intended recipient retrieves the message from his or her mailbox 
and can then read, save, or delete the message.177 
Unlike a phone call, the entire e-mail message is delivered vir­
tually instantaneously, spending an "infinitesimal amount[] of time 
[actually] 'en route."'178 Thus, for someone other than the in­
tended recipient to acquire the contents of such a communication, 
the usual method is to duplicate one of the copies of the message 
that are held in temporary electronic storage, either at some point 
en route, or at the destination computer.179 
If no interception occurs when an electronic communication is 
acquired from storage, as the Steve Jackson test asserts, then "inter­
ception of E-mail within the prohibition of the ECPA [would be] 
virtually impossible. "180 This virtual impossibility would render the 
177. Id. 
178. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 888 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Nicole Giallonardo, Note, Steve Jackson Games v. 
United States Secret Service: The Government's Unauthorized Seizure of Private E­
Mail Warrants More Than the Fifth Circuit's Slap on the Wrist, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COM­
PUTER & INFO. L. 179, 198 (1995) (citing Sebastian J. Leonardi, Roadmap to the In­
ternet, BARRISTER, Spring 1995, at 18). 
179. Konop II, 302 F.3d at 888. 
180. Id. (quoting Jarrod J. White, E-mail@Work.com: Employer Monitoring of 
Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079,1083 (1997)); see also United States v. Steiger, 
318 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that under the storage test very few acquisi­
tions of electronic communications would be "interceptions" under the statute, and that 
in fact such interception would be "virtually impossible"); Kristi Belt, Note, Did Con­
gress Really Intend to Give Investigative Officers Free Reign With Your Personal Elec­
tronic Mail?-Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 
(5th Cir. 1994),41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1457, 1472 (2000) (charging that the Steve Jackson 
analysis "fail[s] to take into consideration" the very nature of an e-mail message); Jar­
rod J. White, E-Mail@Work.com: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. 
L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1997) (asserting that under the Steve Jackson approach there is but 
"a narrow window during which an E-mail interception may occur ... , [and] unless 
some type of automatic routing software is used ... , interception of E-mail within the 
prohibition of the ECPA is virtually impossible"); Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 198 
(stating that under the Steve Jackson approach the Wiretap Act would "not protect e­
mail at all" because of the nature of the technology); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveil­
lance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REv. 9, 55, 83 (2004) 
(noting that under the storage/transit test, law enforcement can easily circumvent the 
super-warrant requirements of the Wiretap Act by simply waiting "perhaps a nano­
second" until the e-mail has reached its final destination, and that under this interpreta­
tion the number of investigations that will have to confront wiretap restrictions is re­
duced to "almost zero"). Regardless of whether interception would be nearly 
impossible, it would certainly be very unlikely since any hacker intent on acquiring 
messages could easily avoid prosecution for violating the Wiretap Act by simply making 
the acquisitions "from the dozens, or even hundreds, of places an electronic communi­
cation resides, usually for 'mere nanoseconds,' [on] the Internet." Stephen V. Treglia, 
Transitory E-Storage: First Circuit Creates New Legal Concept in 'Councilman,' N.Y. 
L.J., Sept. 20, 2005, at 5, 7. 
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entire set of changes by the ECPA to the prior Wiretap Act largely 
ineffective, contrary to Congress's intent in enacting the changes. 
When Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in 1968, and again 
when it amended it in 1986, it made clear that the underlying pur­
pose of the law was to protect the expectation of privacy in private 
communications.181 The ECPA's revisions were meant to update 
the Wiretap Act and expand its protections beyond wire and oral 
communications, to include privacy protections for electronic com­
munications.182 In particular, Congress was concerned with ensur­
ing the privacy of communications in accordance with the principles 
embodied in the Fourth Amendment.183 The storage test clearly 
defeats this fundamental purpose by making interception of elec­
tronic communications "virtually impossible. "184 Therefore, the 
181. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 
§ 801(b), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555; see also Belt, supra note 180, at 1472, 1474 (noting that e-mail 
is transmitted to a recipient with the same expectation of privacy as attends telephone 
calls and ordinary postal-service mail, and asserting that privacy interests "remain con­
stant regardless of the form of the communication"). Arguably, the same reasoning 
applies regardless of whether an e-mail is "on the wire" or in temporary storage, when 
that e-mail has not yet been delivered to the intended recipient: the expectation of 
privacy should be unaffected by these temporary technological distinctions. 
182. S. REp. No. 99-541, at 3; see also Belt, supra note 180, at 1470; Giallonardo, 
supra note 178, at 198-203 (discussing Congress's intent of protecting the privacy of 
electronic communications and ensuring the public's confidence in using such forms of 
communication). Belt identifies Congress's desire to update the Wiretap Act in light of 
technological and structural changes in the telecommunications industry. Belt, supra 
note 180, at 1470; see also S. REp. No. 99-541, at 5 (stating that "the law must advance 
with the technology to ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment"). 
Omitting wiretap protections while e-mail messages are momentarily in storage at vari­
ous points along the transmission path would in fact ignore the technological and struc­
tural developments that make e-mail possible in the first instance. That would clearly 
be contrary to Congress's stated intent. 
183. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5. At least one court has explicitly held that the 
Fourth Amendment'S reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations (ar­
ticulated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 247 (1967» extends, by analogy, to protect 
the privacy of e-mail communications. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 
(C.A.A.F. 1996). The congressional intention to protect privacy is not limited to pri­
vacy for its own sake; it has also been asserted that Congress intended to protect a 
governmental interest in such privacy-that of encouraging the exchange of ideas and 
information. Murphy, supra note 168, at 441; see also Guirguis, supra note 2, at 154 
(arguing that now that Olmstead's physical intrusion test "no longer controls Fourth 
Amendment inquiry, it makes no sense to extend constitutional protection to a locked 
container ... in transit, and then withhold protections from [encrypted e-mails traveling 
the Internet]"). 
184. See supra note 180 and accompanying text; Brief for the Center for Democ­
racy and Technology et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant's Petition for Rehear­
ing and Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(No. 03-1383), 2004 WL 2058257 (characterizing the storage test as causing the Wiretap 
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storage test must be rejected.185 
2. 	 The StorageiTransit Test Arises From a Misreading of the 
Statute 
In addition to its failure to advance Congress's general purpose 
in enacting the ECPA, the storage/transit test is the product of an 
improper reading of the specific statutory language. Language in 
two sections of the ECPA makes clear that Congress anticipated 
that at least some acquisitions from electronic storage could consti­
tute "interception" of electronic communications.186 Furthermore, 
the legislative history shows that the addition of language pertain­
ing to storage to the definition of "wire communication" was not 
intended to have any implicit impact on the definition of "electronic 
communication. " 
First, two provisions of the ECPA indicate that Congress con­
sidered interception by acquiring electronic communications from 
electronic storage entirely possible.187 The first section was added 
as an amendment to the Wiretap Act's definition of "electronic 
communication" in 1996. In § 2510(12)(D), Congress added the 
following to the short list of exclusions, things not considered elec­
tronic communications despite the broad language of the definition: 
"electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institu­
tion in a communications system used for the electronic storage and 
transfer of funds."188 If, as Steve Jackson held, electronic communi­
cations in storage could never be "intercepted" under the Wiretap 
Act, then why would the definition of "electronic communication" 
need a specific exclusion for stored financial information? The fact 
Act to be "unhinged" from the Supreme Court's precedent on the Fourth Amendment 
requirements for electronic surveillance, because it would permit law enforcement to 
easily circumvent the Wiretap Act and "reduce [it] to almost a nUllity"). 
185. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 76 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[D]espite the exis­
tence of literal language that might dictate a contrary result, a court should interpret a 
statute in such a way as to effectuate clear legislative intent. "). 
186. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510(D), 2701 (2000). 
187. See infra text accompanying notes 188-194; see also 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510(D), 
2701 (2000). Various other sections of the Stored Communications Act also refer to 
electronic communications that are in electronic storage, demonstrating that the Steve 
Jackson reading of the definition of "electronic communication" as excluding any such 
communication in storage is without merit. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 2701(a) (referring to 
an "electronic communication while it is in electronic storage") and § 2703(a) (2000) 
(entitled "CONTENTS OF ELECfRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN ELEC­
TRONIC STORAGE"). 
188. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 731(1), 18 U.S.c. 
§ 251O(12)(D) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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that this amendment explicitly excludes certain "stored" informa­
tion from the definition shows that Congress clearly felt that the 
existing definition did include at least some such communications 
while in storage. 
The other section of the statute that makes a similar assump­
tion is § 2701 of the SCA.189 There, the text states that "whoever 
... obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or elec­
tronic communication while it is in electronic storage ... shall be 
punished as provided [elsewhere]."19o Subsection (c) then states 
that the provision just quoted "does not apply with respect to con­
duct authorized ... in section ... 2518 of this title."191 Section 2518 
is the provision of the Wiretap Act describing the process by which 
an application for court-authorized "interception of a wire, oral, or 
electronic communication" may be made.192 Thus, the SCA pro­
vides penalties for unauthorized access of stored electronic commu­
nications, unless that access has been authorized under the 
interception provisions of the Wiretap Act.193 This can only mean 
that the interception of an electronic communication while it is in 
electronic storage is possible-a possibility that required making an 
explicit exception in the text of the SCA. If no communication in 
storage could be intercepted, there would be no need for the 
exception.194 
The second indication that the storage test is the product of 
statutory misreading comes from the legislative history. The 
ECPA's addition of "includ[ing] any electronic storage of such com­
munication"195 to the definition of "wire communication" was not 
189. See 18 v.s.c. § 2701; Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 183-84. 
190. 18 V.S.c. § 2701(a) (emphasis added). 
191. 18 V.S.c. § 2701(c). 
192. 18 V.S.c. § 2518 (2000). 
193. Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 197. Giallonardo believes that this exception 
"indicates that, if the proper warrant is obtained, the government may legally intercept 
an electronic communication in electronic storage. Therefore, ... [at least some] stored 
electronic communications are subject to interception under the Federal Wiretap Act." 
Id. Giallonardo would go so far as to apply the exception to e-mail that had been 
delivered but not yet read by the intended recipient. Id. at 197-98. Whether the protec­
tions of the Wiretap Act should extend that far (and this Note does not address that 
issue), the exception stated in § 2701 still indicates that at least some electronic commu­
nications in storage can be intercepted. 
194. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 457 (arguing that language throughout the 
ECPA, similar to that in § 2701, "would make little to no sense" if communications in 
storage were not included in the coverage). 
195. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I, 
§ 101(a)(6)(C), 100 Stat. 1848,1849 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 V.S.C. § 2510(1) 
(2000)). 
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meant to draw a distinction with "electronic communication," but 
rather was simply intended to clarify or emphasize the fact that the 
meaning of "wire communication" was meant to cover stored ver­
sions of such communications, such as voice mail. 196 
Because wire communications can take place entirely absent 
any electronic storage, Congress wanted to indicate clearly that the 
wiretap law was also meant to cover the storage of such communi­
cations, such as in a voice mail system.197 In contrast, the technol­
ogy underlying electronic communications makes it impossible for 
such transfers to occur without the use of electronic storage at vari­
ous points along the transmission path. Thus, no explicit inclusion 
of electronic storage was needed in the definition of "electronic 
communication," since reading the text as excluding such intrinsic 
and inevitable storage would render the wiretap law's protection of 
electronic communications virtually meaningless.198 
3. 	 The Storageffransit Test is the Product of a Faulty 
Analytic Process 
In addition to its problems satisfying legislative intent and the 
text of the statute itself, the storage test under Steve Jackson was 
the product of faulty legal reasoning. The court in Steve Jackson 
inappropriately relied on a "plain language" approach to interpret­
ing the statute that does not hold up under close examination.199 
There are two basic problems with this approach. 
First, even the "plain" reading of the statute's text requires 
some degree of additional reasoning, beyond simply taking the 
words (or their absence) at face value. The plain reading argument 
relies on a canon of construction (that inclusion of language in one 
provision and omission of that language in another provision is de­
196. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); S. REP. No. 
99-541, at 12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566 (describing the pur­
pose of the revision as "to specify that wire communications in storage like voice mail, 
remain wire communications, and are protected accordingly"). 
197. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop I), 236 F.3d 1035, 1045 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
198. See id. Indeed, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the original sponsor for the Senate 
version of the ECPA, has stated that the storage test is inconsistent with the legislative 
history and "would essentially render ECPA's extension of [the Wiretap Act] to elec­
tronic communications a dead letter." Brief on Rehearing En Banc for Senator Patrick 
J. Leahy as Amicus Curiae Supporting the United States and Urging Reversal, United 
States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2004 WL 2707307. 
199. Belt, supra note 180, at 1458-59; see Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret 
Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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liberate and meaningfu1)20o and an inference that the omission of 
"storage from the definition of 'electronic communication'" was 
meant to indicate complete exclusion of stored electronic communi­
cations, including when that storage is a part of the transmission 
process.201 Reliance on the canon to support the implicit inference 
demonstrates that the plain language, by itself, "is not so plain."202 
Indeed, this reliance is not terribly surprising. As the Supreme 
Court has noted, "linguistic analysis [alone] seldom is adequate 
when a statute is designed to incorporate fundamental values."203 
In addition, the definitions for "wire communication" and 
"electronic communication" are not sufficiently parallel to warrant 
application of the canon in the first place.204 The essential basis for 
Steve Jackson's storage test was the notion that the language of the 
two definitions should be compared and contrasted in order to infer 
what Congress intended the statute to cover.205 But this approach 
is flawed, because the two definitions are both structurally and tem­
porally dissimilar.206 The definition of "wire communication" was 
written, in most of its essentials, for the 1968 version of the Wiretap 
Act.207 The clause "and such term includes any electronic storage 
of such communication" was tacked on to the existing definition 
when the ECPA was enacted in 1986, but the definition was not 
otherwise changed, except in minor or irrelevant ways.208 
In contrast, the definition for "electronic communication" was 
drafted from scratch almost twenty years after the original Wiretap 
200. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Russello 
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589-90 (1968) (holding that opening 
an unlocked door violated a statutory prohibition on "breaking open" the door, despite 
the lack of the use of force, based on constitutional values underlying the statute). In­
deed, the values at issue in the statute in Sabbath were the very same Fourth Amend­
ment protections that underlie the Wiretap Act, passed in the same year that Sabbath 
was decided. Id.; see supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text. 
204. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 74-75. 
205. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th 
Cir. 1994). 
206. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 75. 
207. Id. "The revised definition [of wire communication] hews closely to its origi­
nal definition in the 1968 Wiretap Act." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 213 (1968). 
208. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I, 
§ 101(a)(1)(D), 100 Stat. 1848,1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. § 2510(1) 
(2000)); see also Councilman, 418 F.3d at 78 (noting that the clause was added to the 
definition of "wire communication" during Senate markup). 
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Act, is defined in broad terms, and (unlike "wire communication") 
contains a listing of four specific exclusions.209 The definition of 
"electronic communication" does not include any specific reference 
to electronic storage, except in one of the narrow, specific, exclu­
sions.210 Thus, both in terms of when the definitions were written 
and in terms of their structure, the definitions of "wire communica­
tion" and "electronic communication" are not sufficiently parallel 
to warrant a plain text comparison.211 Read by itself, without com­
parison to "wire communication," the plain text of the definition of 
"electronic communication" is ambiguous as to whether at least 
some messages in temporary storage could be intercepted within 
the statute's meaning.212 Therefore, the plain language of the stat­
ute is not determinative. 
B. 	 "Intercept" Should Be Determined Using a Broad 
Contemporaneity Standard 
Having demonstrated the analytic, structural, and substantive 
flaws of the Steve Jackson storage test, the question remains: how 
should "intercept" of electronic communications be determined? 
Although the court in Councilman made the right call in rejecting 
the Steve Jackson storage test, the First Circuit failed to provide any 
interpretive guidance of its own. This Note argues that the basic 
contemporaneous-with-transmission standard, unfettered by the 
storage straightjacket, is the appropriate standard of analysis.213 In 
enacting the ECPA, Congress recognized and attempted to protect 
the expectation of privacy in electronic communications.214 The 
contemporaneous-with-transmission interpretation, properly de­
209. See Councilman, 418 F.3d at 75, 77. The court also pointed out that the 
listing of the four exclusions brought a separate canon of construction into play: 
"Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, ad­
ditional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legis­
lative intent." Id. at 75 (quoting TRW v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,28 (2001)) (emphasis 
added). The fact that this canon existed in tension with the inclusion/exclusion canon 
meant that "[a]pplying [the] canons of construction does not resolve the question." Id. 
at 76. 
210. 18 U.S.c. § 2510(12) (2000); see Councilman, 418 F.3d at 73. 
211. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 75. 
212. Id. at 76. 
213. See Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 206 (stating that the Steve Jackson court 
should have applied the basic Turk view of interception, requiring an acquisition simul­
taneous with the act of communication). 
214. See S. REp. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 
3559. 
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fined, ensures that those expectations of privacy are effectively 
protected. 
The essential kernel of interception, identified in Turk, is that 
the surveillance activity-the acquisition-occurs at the time of the 
communication and thereby causes the communication's contents 
to become known to the unauthorized person conducting the sur­
veillance.215 Fundamentally, this is precisely the kind of activity 
that the Wiretap Act as amended by the ECPA is intended to pro­
scribe: acquisition of communications at the time the communica­
tion takes place, regardless of whether it is an oral, wire, or 
electronic communication. 
"Contemporaneous" is not a term of art.216 It does not appear 
in the statute,217 and its first use by the Fifth Circuit in Turk was 
simply a straight-forward, plain-English description of the privacy 
interest meant to be protected by the Wiretap Act.218 The language 
of that court, which expressed concern over "activity engaged in at 
the time of the ... communication,"219 has been echoed by several 
of the courts analyzing contemporaneity since then. They have de­
scribed the standard as involving a determination of "real-time in­
terception,"22o an "acquisition during 'flight,' "221 a simultaneous 
acquisition,222 or a "real-time requirement."223 The various de­
scriptions-real-time, during flight, simultaneous, or at the time of 
communication-all carry the same basic connotation, that acquir­
ing the contents of a communication while the act or process of 
communication is occurring must be regarded as a violation of the 
Wiretap Act. 
Not all messages acquired from electronic storage will satisfy 
this standard. Messages acquired from long-term, post-delivery 
storage will usually be acquired "a substantial amount of time af­
ter" the transmission process has occurred, and thus will not consti­
215. See United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976). The exact lan­
guage of Turk, in the context of a tape-recorded conversation, was: "activity engaged in 
at the time of the oral communication which causes such communication to be over­
heard by uninvited listeners." Id. (emphasis added). 
216. See id. at 659 (noting that "acquisition" in the statute, which the court 
equated with "contemporaneous," was "used by the Congress neither as a term of art 
nor as a term of technology"). 
217. Id. at 658. 
218. See id. 
219. Id. (emphasis added). 
220. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003). 
221. Id. 
222. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003). 
223. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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tute "contemporaneous" acquisitions that violate the Wiretap 
Act.224 On the other hand, at least some acquisitions from storage 
will be able to satisfy this real-time version of contemporaneity. 
Electronic communications will often be both in storage and in 
transit at the same time.225 When such communications are "ac­
quired while ... still en route to the intended recipients,"226 it is 
practically a truism that such acquisitions are made "at the time of 
the communication," in real-time, and even "during flight,"227-in 
other words, contemporaneously. 
The narrowing of Turk's broad contemporaneity standard to a 
mechanistic storage inquiry228 was unnecessary. The courts em­
ploying the storage test have found no violation of the Wiretap Act 
in factual circumstances that would have failed the broader contem­
poraneity test as well. The facts of Steve Jackson (e-mail on a hard 
drive, after delivery but before being read by the intended recipi­
ent), Konop II (unauthorized viewing of a website well after it had 
been posted), Steiger (acquisition of files stored on a hard drive), 
and Fraser (employee's e-mail stored on a company hard drive read 
by the employer) all involved acquisitions of communications that 
were not in any way "contemporaneous" with the act of communi­
cating.229 As the First Circuit noted in In re Pharmatrak, the other 
circuits had invoked the contemporaneity standard to exclude ac­
quisitions made "a substantial amount of time after material was put 
into electronic storage."230 In reality, the courts did not need the 
224. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 21 (citing Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048-50; 
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2002); and 
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
225. United States v. Councilman, 245 F.Supp.2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003), affd 
by United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 203 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, reh'g granted 
en bane, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam), rev'd, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). 
226. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 80. 
227. This description may require viewing "flight" in its broad sense, as being 
somewhere in the process of going from A (sender) to B (recipient). 
228. See Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 198 (describing the storage test as a "nar­
row interpretation" of interception under the Wiretap Act). But cf Pikowsky, supra 
note 39, at 53 (comparing the Steve Jackson rejection of Wiretap Act protections for 
electronic communications in storage to the "discredited rationale of Olmstead, which 
denied Fourth Amendment protection against wiretaps conducted without a physical 
trespass"). 
229. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 459 (5th 
Cir. 1994); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 872-73 (9th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (11th Cir. 2003); Fraser v. Na­
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 2003). 
230. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. 
Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-50 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added); Konop II, 302 F.3d at 
872-73; and Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 
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storage/transit dichotomy to find that no "contemporaneous" ac­
quisition had occurred in those cases.231 In fact, applying the "real­
time" understanding of contemporaneous, as described above, 
would change the rationale but not the outcome of those cases. 
Thus, rejecting the unnecessary storage test in favor of the more 
logical real-time conceptualization of the contemporaneity standard 
would bring the application of the Wiretap Act to electronic com­
munications in line with the intent of Congress without seriously 
undermining the existing case law. 
C. A Framework for Determining Interception 
With the federal circuits now technically in conflict over the 
proper interpretation of the "intercept" of electronic communica­
tions, a framework for analysis is needed to reconcile the opposing 
views. This Note proposes the use of the contemporaneous-with­
communication standard in its broad sense, as first articulated in 
United States v. Turk, and as discussed immediately above.232 In 
addition, to aid in the application of this standard, a triad of factors 
bearing on the question of contemporaneity is suggested. 
The first factor to consider is whether the acquisition of an 
electronic communication occurred when that communication was 
in electronic storage. Such an acquisition is usually not contempo­
raneous with the transmission process.233 Thus, this factor weighs 
against contemporaneity, and against finding an "intercept" in vio­
lation of the Wiretap Act. This is virtually the same test as is cur­
rently used by the courts that observe the Steve Jackson storage/ 
transit test. The difference is that when characterized as merely 
one factor in the determination, it is no longer conclusive. The facts 
of Councilman provide the most obvious example of when an ac­
quisition would be considered contemporaneous, despite an acqui­
sition from electronic storage. 
1994)) (emphasis added); see also Murphy, supra note 168, at 454-55 (noting that the 
issue in Councilman, pre-delivery acquisition, had not been faced by prior courts that 
had relied on the storage test). 
231. Brief for the Appellant at 29-30, United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 
(1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2003 WL 24014616 (noting that none of the cases in the 
other circuits had involved "acquisition of communications during transmission," and 
that therefore any language suggesting a storage test was merely dicta) (emphasis 
added). 
232. See supra Part IV.B. 
233. See Karen Ertel, E-Mail Intercept Violates Wiretap Law, First Circuit Holds, 
TRIAL, Nov. 1 2005, at 83, 85 (describing the facts of Councilman as presenting a unique 
case). 
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The second factor is whether the electronic communication 
was acquired prior to reaching its final destination. Given the virtu­
ally instantaneous nature of the electronic communications process, 
when a communication is acquired prior to delivery to its intended 
recipient, the acquisition is likely to be contemporaneous with the 
act of communication. Thus, this second factor weighs in favor of 
an "intercept" in violation of the Wiretap Act.234 Of course, this 
factor is not dispositive, either. It is unlikely, for example, that 
Congress intended for communications that are stored as "dead let­
ters," when undeliverable to their intended recipient, to remain in­
definitely protected by the Wiretap ACt.235 
A third important factor to consider is whether the acquisition 
occurred virtually simultaneously with the communication process. 
If so, this factor would weigh heavily in favor of finding an "inter­
cept" in violation of the Wiretap Act. When the surveillance 
method acquires the contents of a private communication virtually 
at the same instant in which the act of communication is occurring, 
it should not matter whether the contents were acquired from stor­
age nor whether they were acquired a second or two after delivery 
to the intended recipient. The function of the ECPA in protecting 
the privacy of such communications should dictate that such acqui­
sitions are forbidden. 
The most important aspect of this series of factors is that none 
of them is dispositive. They can be used to simplify the initial eval­
uation of a given acquisition of an electronic communication, but 
ultimately the courts must exercise reasonable judgment, taking 
into account the facts and circumstances of each case, in determin­
ing whether the acquisition constitutes a contemporaneous acquisi­
tion in violation of the Wiretap Act. The factors are an aid to that 
determination, but the standard to be used in deciding whether an 
"intercept" under the statute has occurred is the real-time, contem­
poraneous-with-communication standard. 
234. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 455 (describing the acquisition of an elec­
tronic communication before delivery to the intended recipient's mailbox as a "crucial" 
distinction). 
235. See United States v. Councilman, 245 F.Supp.2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003), 
affd by United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 203 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, reh'g 
granted en bane, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam), rev'd, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 
2005) (noting that if retrieval of messages from storage was not uniformly deemed to 
fail the "intercept" requirement, courts would be required to sort which forms of stor­
age are covered by the statute and which, such as back-up copies and undeliverable 
messages, are not). 
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CONCLUSION 
The First Circuit's decision in United States v. Councilman is in 
conflict with the strict rule established by other circuits that any 
acquisition of an electronic communication from any form of stor­
age cannot, by definition, be a violation of the Wiretap Act. This is 
a consequence of the shortcomings of the so-called storage/transit 
dichotomy as a rule for interpreting the scope of "interception" 
under the statute. Over the past decade, various circuits have 
adopted the storage test, but have applied it to factual circum­
stances that would not even have satisfied the contemporaneity 
standard, absent the storage test.236 Thus, the storage-based nar­
rowing of traditional contemporaneity was unnecessary, and in ret­
rospect inappropriate. Contrary to the legislative intent underlying 
the ECPA, the storage test renders violation of the Wiretap Act, 
with respect to electronic communications, virtually impossible.237 
Therefore, the Steve Jackson storage/transit test for interception 
must be rejected, and a new framework for analysis erected in its 
place. 
The contemporaneous-with-transmission standard remains the 
most appropriate measure of interception under the Wiretap Act. 
But the term "contemporaneous" is a broad one, not easily reduced 
to a reliable and consistent, mechanistic test. Courts should evalu­
ate the contemporaneity of an alleged interception on a case-by­
case basis, considering all the facts and circumstances of each case. 
Whether an electronic communication is retrieved from electronic 
storage, whether the communication has yet been delivered to its 
intended recipient, and whether the acquisition occurs simultaneous 
with the transmission process itself are all factors to be considered. 
They can give courts initial guidance on the question of intercep­
tion, but the ultimate determination of whether a given acquisition 
occurred contemporaneous with transmission must rest with the 
judgment of the courts. 
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